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Dear Editor,
Thank you very much for your letter dated June 14 2017 with regard to our 
manuscript entitled “Resiliency Assessment of Urban Rail Transit Networks: 
Shanghai Metro as an Example (SAFETY_2017_122). Authors’ special thanks 
also goes to the reviewers. All the comments and recommendations are quite 
insightful and valuable to improve the quality of our manuscript. According to the 
comments, we have checked the manuscript thoroughly and revised it carefully. 
Revised portion are marked in yellow in the revised manuscript. Detail responses to 
the comments can be found in the document named by “response to reviewers”.
Should you need to contact me, please use the above address or call me at (86)-21-
6598-9273. You may also contact me by fax at (86)-21-6598-5017 or via e-mail at 
huanghw@tongji.edu.cn  
Sincerely,
Hongwei Huang
Ref: SAFETY_2017_122 
Resiliency Assessment of Urban Rail Transit Networks: Shanghai Metro as an Example 
Dear Editor,
We would like to thank the reviewers and editor for their time and their thoughtful comments. All the 
comments and recommendations are quite insightful and valuable to improve the quality of our 
manuscript. According to these comments, the manuscript has been thoroughly revised. The revised 
portion is marked in yellow in the revised manuscript. Detailed responses to the comments can be found 
below. Reviewer #1:
1. Recommend restructuring sections or rewording the introduction to include a stronger framework with more 
succinct transitions between sections. 
Reply:
Following the reviewer’s very good suggestion, the authors have revised the introduction to add 
transitions between sections and an explicit framework in the last paragraph of the introduction. 
Line 63 – 65: “Quite a number of studies have been carried out by analyzing networks for the safety of metro 
systems in particular with the topographical mapping modelling (Crucitti et al., 2003; Derrible and Kennedy, 2010; 
Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Zhang et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2011).”
Line 78 – 81: “The above network assessment models, however, are mainly qualitative with conceptualized 
measures that do not offer a rigorous comparison of safety levels among networks. In this respect, network analysis 
with quantitative measures of robustness and vulnerability is thus helpful for examining the safety level of a specific 
network.”
Line 89 – 91: “Additionally, disrupting a large-scale metro network by an accident affects not only the robustness 
but also the subsequent recovery.  Recovery profiles over time greatly affect the economic and social wellbeing 
outcomes that are of great concern to metro owners.”
Line 94 – 97: “In the context of recovery, robustness and vulnerability analyses are still insufficient to offer a 
rational recovery strategy in terms of recovery sequencing and duration for stations and tunnels in a metro network.”
Line 98 – 101: “A comprehensive safety assessment model includes both the network robustness and the 
recovery profile as provided by Ayyub (2014).  In this context, the concept of “resilience” would provide an 
appropriate solution to cover both the robustness and recovery in a single model for safety evaluation of a network 
system (Ayyub, 2015; Bruneau et al., 2003).” 
Line 124 – line 127: “This paper provides a general framework for the resilience analysis of large-scale metro 
network systems that offers an immediate basis for identifying both the best recovery sequences to minimize the 
performance loss and the best repair duration to minimize the costs associated with disruption and recovery.” 
Line 135 – 141: “The main body of the paper is provided in two subsequent primary sections.  The first primary 
section provides the detailed description of the resilience model according to the above four items.  The second 
primary section provides an application of the above resilience model to the Shanghai metro.  Recovery strategies 
are discussed for (a) a single multi-line station, and (b) multiple stations in terms of repair sequences that minimize 
the resilience loss triangle.  Then, a brief application example focusing on cost analysis during disruption and 
recovery is used to illustrate the concepts introduced.  Finally, concluding remarks are presented.”
2. While I do believe this study is fascinating and "worthy of investigation" I urge you to consider making a more 
substantive claim earlier in the paper demonstrating how findings in this study may have implications and 
applications outside of Shanghai.
Reply:
The reviewer’s comment is quite appreciated. Yes, the proposed resilience analysis model is 
suitable not only for the Shanghai case, but also for complex metro network systems of other 
big cities, such as London, Beijing, New York, Paris, and etc. The Shanghai metro is only one example 
used in this paper for the purpose of demonstrating the application of the proposed model to such a 
complex metro network. The authors have added the potential use of the proposed model 
explicitly in the last paragraph of introduction in line 141 – 144. 
“Although the illustrative examples in this paper are based on the Shanghai metro, the proposed resiliency model 
is applicable for safety analysis of other complex metro networks, such as in London, New York, etc., with the 
emphasis on network robustness and recovery.”
-Reviewer 2
Review comments 
Manuscript number SAFETY_2017_122
Title:  “Resiliency Assessment Model of Urban Rail Transit Networks: Shanghai Metro as an Example”
1. Title: Ok
2. Abstract: Clear and logical. Nicely point out the key findings of the results.
3. Keywords: Add “vulnerability” 
Reply:
We have added the key word “Vulnerability” in the revised manuscript. Thanks for the good suggestion.
4. Introduction
(i) At p-5, the sentence “cost related to recovery stage should also be taken into account for a full assessment of 
the resiliency of the metro network” is mentioned. But this paper has not addressed the cost related recovery 
analysis. 
Reply:
Yes, this is very important. We have revised the manuscript extensively to address this issue. Apart 
from proposing the general framework for resilience analysis, we now discuss the cost during disruption 
and recovery stage, however omit the cost-related analysis for the safe operation in lifetime of the metro 
system due to less relevance to the scope of the paper. For an optimized recovery strategy, when the 
best recovery sequence is determined by the proposed resilience model (i.e., maximizing the index Re), 
the key question for the decision maker is the best repair duration to be determined. Obviously, it should 
be related to the cost during the disruption and repair works. Hence, the cost in this paper includes 
the disruption cost Cdisruption and the repair cost Crepair.  Each component of the costs, i.e., 
Cdisruption and Crepair, is newly discussed extensively in the following: 
For disruption cost Cdisruption, two major categories are analyzed in the conceptualized form, 
including: 1) disfunction of equipment and abandonment of facility in metro station; and 2) 
income and stocks loss due to close of metro operation.  Taking the flood induced failure of metro 
station for an example, once the station is assumed to be disrupted by the severe flood, the equipment 
such as track barriers, escalator, signal board and etc., could be partially or totally disabled.  Later on, 
the control rooms and power plant rooms might also be affected due to the floods.  Furthermore, when 
the metro station is completely closed, the incomes including the tickets, the retails and other business 
around the metro stations might be lost.  In addition, the stocks of the metro company will be further 
affected due to the disruptions. All those cost factors are listed in Table 1 (newly added in the 
revised manuscript).  However, to incorporating all these factors in this study would be too 
complicated and straightforward for the decision-making.  In this case, for ease of discussion, the cost 
analysis for Cdisruption in this manuscript is mainly based on the income loss of the tickets Cticket (Cdisruption 
= Cticket in this paper) which can be quantitatively evaluated.  Those other cost factors in Table 1 could 
be related to the ticket income qualitatively with a coefficient (Cothers = λ×Cticket) if interested in the next 
study.
For the repair cost Crepair, it includes the direct cost and indirect cost.  The direct cost is related 
to the salary of workers, consumption of engineering materials, rental of the engineering machinery etc.  
Some typical direct costs are also shown in Table 1.  For a certain repair project, shortening the repair 
duration t can be achieved by an increase of salary, the use of high quality materials, and more 
machinery.  Hence, the direct cost is believed to be negatively correlated with the repair time duration 
t.  The indirect cost is caused by social related factors (also shown in Table 1), which is believed to be 
positively correlated with the time duration t.  Hence, the repair cost is a typical time-cost trade-off 
problem which can be solved by the LP/IP hybrid method proposed by Liu et al. (1995).  
Table 1 Cost produced due to disruption of metro station
Cost Category Content
track 
track barrier
escalator
signal board
ticket barrier
air-conditioning system
Disfunction of equipment
ventilation system
managing control room
power plant room
ventilation room
signal system room
Abandonment of facility
escape shaft
metro ticket
retail
mall
rental
Income loss
real estate
Disruption cost
Stocks stocks
salary of workers
monitoring and inspection before repair
site investigation 
construction materials
rental of engineering machinery
Direct cost
purchase of  power, ventilation and signal system
time value
Repair Cost
Indirect cost social impact 
The above detailed discussion on the cost and Table 1 are newly added in the revised 
manuscript. 
Line 292 – line 298:  “The recovery of network connectivity is a primary goal for decision makers; however, 
disruption and repair costs associated with recovery profiles a key criterion in decision making.  Once the recovery 
sequence is selected, the particulars of recovery plans, i.e., repair methods, equipment, etc., affect the repair 
duration and subsequently the recovery cost.  Generally, advanced techniques for repair work require less time 
to complete recovery task, but at a greater cost.  Hence, a recovery cost analysis in terms of repair time duration 
helps to determine the optimized cost of repair.” 
Line 303 – line 322: “Following the basic model proposed by Henry and Ramirez-Marquez (2012), the total cost 
Ctotal during the disruption and repair stages is generally composed of two parts, namely the cost Cdisruption and the 
cost Crepairs, represented as:
(11)total disruption repair
C C C 
where the Cdisruption is referred to the cost or income loss due to the disruption of network connectivity and the 
Crepairs means the cost or investment for the repair works.  Taking the flood-induced failure of metro station as an 
example, the Cdisruption might include two major categories, i.e., damaged but repairable equipment and damaged 
but non-repairable equipment, and income loss due to closing of metro operations.  Once a station is set as 
disrupted by flooding, the equipment such as track barriers, escalator, signal board and etc., could be partially or 
totally disabled.  Later on, the control rooms and power plant rooms might also be affected due to flooding.  
Furthermore, when the metro station is completely closed, loss in income from ticket sales, the retails and other 
business around the metro stations comes on top.  In addition, the stocks or reputation of the metro company 
could be affected due to the disruptions.  Details of the above disruption cost are shown in Table 1.  However, 
incorporating all the factors shown in Table 1 for disruption cost Cdisruption requires data that are not available in 
some cases.  For ease of discussion, the cost analysis for Cdisruption in this paper includes mainly the income loss 
in the ticket sales Cticket (Cdisruption = Cticket in this paper) which can be quantitatively evaluated.  Some other cost 
factors in Table 1 could be related qualitatively to the ticket income using perhaps multiplication coefficients 
(Cothers = λ×Cticket) as an example.”
Line 406 – line 409: “After determining the optimal repair sequence by the resilience analysis model as shown 
in Figure 4, the optimal repair duration for each station could be obtained from the above cost analysis.  Therefore, 
the best recovery strategy due to the disruption can be achieved both with the best recovery sequence and duration.” 
Overall, the philosophy behind the recovery strategy for disrupted metro system is first to select a best 
recovery sequence and second to select a best repair duration considering both the disruption and 
repair cost.  In order to show the application of the above cost analysis, an example of cost 
analysis for recovering a completely disrupted metro station by rebuilding a new station is 
discussed in the revised manuscript:
Line 531 – line 539: “Furthermore, repair duration should be optimized on the basis of minimizing the disruption 
and repair costs.  The philosophy behind the recovery strategy for a disrupted metro system is first to select the 
best recovery sequence either for an exchange station or for multiple stations and second to select the best repair 
duration considering both the disruption and repair cost.  In this regard, the following section shows an example 
of three typical cases of the resilience analysis of the Shanghai metro network: Case 1 is to obtain the best recovery 
sequence for a disrupted exchange station; Case 2 is to obtain the best recovery sequence for multiple disrupted 
stations; and Case 3 is to obtain the best repair duration for rebuilding a disrupted metro station.  ”  
Line 621 – line 665: 
“Case 3: Recovery cost to rebuild a disrupted metro station
In this hypothetical example, a metro station is disrupted completely at time t0 and requires rebuilding of the 
damaged station.  For ease of discussion, t0 is assumed to be zero.  In addition, time-value of money is not 
considered in this example for simplicity.  During the repair procedure, the metro station is closed to the public.  
As mentioned previously, the disruption cost in the recovery stage is assumed to only include the income loss 
related to metro tickets.  From the statistics of the Shanghai metro, the daily passenger flow volume is more 
than 10 million.  Hence, the disruption of one station among the 303 stations of the whole network is assumed to 
lead in a loss of about 40 thousand passengers flow volume every day.  The ticket price of Shanghai metro is 
about 4 RMB on average.  For this case, from Eq. 13b, the disruption cost during the recovery procedure can be 
calculated as below:
 1 01 4 400002disruptionC t t    (15)
where t1 is the recovered time moment that is unknown and needs to be optimized and t0 is equal to zero that is 
assumed in this example.  
The rebuilding of a metro station requires several stages in sequence, including the site investigation, 
construction of a pile foundation of underground structures, construction of a soil retaining system, soil excavation 
with construction of supports and dewatering, and construction of underground structures of the metro station.  
From personal communication with the managers in charge of design, construction and operation, Table 8 shows 
a typical example of repair options associated with the direct cost and duration for rebuilding one typical metro 
station in Shanghai.  It is quite obvious from direct cost perspectives that the shorter the repair duration, the higher 
the cost. Solving such a typical time-cost tradeoff requires the use of linear and integer programming (LP/IP) models, 
such as Liu et al. (1995).  Table 9 shows the calculated results of repair duration and associated direct cost of 
construction.  The indirect cost is assumed, in this example, to be equal to 100 thousands RMB per day.  Hence, 
the total indirect cost can also be calculated based on the calculated duration, as shown in Table 9.  Figure 14a 
shows the calculated direct cost, indirect cost and the repair cost against the repair duration, respectively (solid 
circles for Crepair, hollow triangles for direct cost and hollow rectangles for indirect cost).  It is observed from Figure 
14a that the optimized repair duration based on repair cost is around 455 days.  Corresponding to this calculated 
repair duration, the disruption cost in terms of the ticket income loss can be derived from Eq. 15, as displayed in 
Table 9.  Hence, the total cost Ctotal both including Cdisruption and Crepair can be obtained as shown in Figure 14b 
(solid circles for Ctotal, hollow circles for Crepair and hollow rectangles for Cdisruption).  The optimized repair duration 
after incorporating the income loss is about 450 days, which is less than the optimized duration considering only 
repair cost.  This finding is reasonable, as the income loss will continue to increase when the repair work is not 
finished.  In this example, the disruption cost only includes the ticket income loss, resulting in a five-day decrease 
of the optimized duration.  Although the number of days in this case is small, the best repair duration might be 
reduced further as other cost elements of disruption are considered.  If the other disruption cost as shown in Table 
1 is considered to be proportional to the ticket income loss, i.e., λ = (Cdisruption-Cticket)/Cticket, Figure 14c has illustrated 
the effect of parameter λ on the optimized repair duration days.  It is clear that as the λ becomes larger, i.e., that 
is to say, the other disruption cost increases, the optimized repair duration days would be greatly reduced.  It is 
consistent with the engineering practice that if the disruption cost is invaluable or social effect of the metro accident 
is unacceptable, the best repair strategy should be as fast as possible.”
Table 8 Repair options for rebuilding a metro station in Shanghai
Procedure Options Cost(million RMB)
Duration
(day)
crew1+equipment1 6 50
Site investigation
crew2+equipment2 8 40
Pile foundation crew1+equipment1 6 30
crew1+equipment1 29 80
Retaining wall
crew2+equipment2 33 70
crew1+equipment1 15 180Excavation /support 
/dewatering crew2+equipment2 20 165
crew1+equipment1 30 120
Underground structure
crew2+equipment2 35 110
Table 9 Integrated repair duration and cost for rebuilding a metro station in Shanghai
CrepairDuration (day)
Direct Cost Indirect cost sum
Cdisruption Ctotal
415 102.0 41.5 143.5 33.2 176.7
420 98.5 42.0 140.5 33.6 174.1
425 95.1 42.5 137.6 34.0 171.6
430 92.5 43.0 135.5 34.4 169.9
435 90.9 43.5 134.4 34.8 169.2
440 89.5 44.0 133.5 35.2 168.7
445 88.0 44.5 132.5 35.6 168.1
450 87.0 45.0 132.0 36.0 168.0
455 86.4 45.5 131.9 36.4 168.3
460 86.0 46.0 132.0 36.8 168.8
Note: cost unit is million RMB.
25.0
75.0
125.0
175.0
410 420 430 440 450 460 470
C
os
t (
m
ill
io
n 
R
M
B
)
Repair duration (day)
Crepair Direct Cost Indirect cost
0.0
60.0
120.0
180.0
240.0
410 420 430 440 450 460 470
C
os
t (
m
ill
io
n 
R
M
B
)
Repair duration (day)
Ctotal Crepair Cdisruption
(a) (b)
400
410
420
430
440
450
460
0 2 4 6 8
O
pt
im
iz
ed
 r
ep
ai
r d
ur
at
io
n 
(d
ay
)
Other disruption Cost / Ticket income 
λ = (Cdisruption-Cticket)/Cticket
Discussion on other disruption cost
(c)
Figure 14 Time-cost trade-off analysis for rebuilding a metro station: a) time-cost for repair cost; b) time-cost for 
total cost including disruption cost and repair cost; and c) effect of other disruption cost on the optimized repair 
duration days ”
(ii) The paper has discussed on the cost related to disruption and recovery stage; but has not contributed in the 
cost-related analysis.
Reply:
We thank the reviewer’s understanding of the cost analysis discussed in the manuscript that is mainly 
for the disruption and recovery stage.  The detailed responses could be referred to the response to the 
comment (i) in 4. introduction. 
(iii) At p-5, in the second paragraph, it is not clear why repair measures are mentioned along with recovery 
measure? It is not discussed at all.
Reply:
Sorry for the wording mistake in the original version of the manuscript. We have deleted the sentence 
to avoid the confusion of miswording. 
5. General framework
(i) Citation error in “Von Ferber et al. (2009)”. It is not matched with the one in reference section.
Reply:
Thanks for the careful check of the citation. We have double checked with the original reference. The 
correct citation should be von Ferber et al. (2009). Hence, the name for author von Ferber is corrected 
in the revised manuscript. 
(ii) In this and subsequent sections, there should be Figure 1 or 2 or 3, etc.; not Fig. 1, 2, or 3.
Reply:
We have revised all the figure captions in the text following the reviewer’s suggestion. 
(iii) In citation, it is shown that authors used “Zhang, et al., 2011”, which should be “Zhang et al., 2011”. Extra 
comma comes up after the first author’s surname, which should not be there as per APA style.
Reply:
Thanks for the reviewer’s kindly reminder. We have read through the formatting requirement for the 
citation for the journal “Safety Science”. We revised all the citations with et al. in the text. 
(iv) At p-8, explain briefly power curve.
(v) Provide reference for the value range in .
Reply:
For a scaled-free network, the distribution P(k) of node degree k, i.e., the relative frequency of 
node degree k, would have a power law with the node degree k.  The general power law could be 
represented by Eq. 5 in the manuscript.  The parameter α and γ are the regression coefficients to 
obtain a best-fitted pow curve between node degree k and its distribution P(k) for a specific 
network.  Literatures have indicated the exponent parameter γ usually ranges from 2.1 to 4 (Barabasi 
and Albert,1999).  Hence, we have revised the description of Eq. 5 in the revised text:
Line 193 – line 197: “The scale-free network is a network that has a distribution of node degrees P(k), i.e., the 
relative frequency of node degree k, following a power distribution:
( )=P k k   (5)
where the parameters α and γ are the regressed coefficients for the power curve of a specific network.  The value 
of γ usually ranges from 2.1 to 4.0 (Barabasi and Albert, 1999).”
The corresponding reference is added after the typical range. 
Reference:
Barabasi, A.L., Albert, R., 1999. Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science 286, 509-512.
(vi) At p-10, citation error is noticed in “Bruneau et al (2003)”, where full stop should come up after “al”.
Reply:
We have revised the citation. Thanks for the careful check. 
(vii) At p-10, in the line 216, the sentence “Hence, for an original metro network without failure…..” is not 
complete. 
Reply:
Sorry to misleading the sentence by inappropriate separation.  We have re-worded the sentences for 
the readability in the revised text:
Line 244 – line 246: “Hence, the magnitudes of robustness and vulnerability of a network depend on the node 
that is disrupted. By examining all the nodes, one at a time, robustness and vulnerability could indicate the order 
of importance of these metro stations for the network.”
(viii) At p-12, in the second line from the top, the sentence “… some of the metro stations are interchanges….” 
has grammatical mistake.
Reply:
We have reworded this sentence as the reviewer suggested. 
(ix) At p-12, Figure 3 should be explained clearly with the proper sequence of a to d, which is not maintained.
Reply:
Thanks for the good suggestion. The authors have added the description of the sequence for recovery 
in Figure 3. The figures are re-ordered accordingly. 
Line 282 – line 284: “A typical sequence is shown in Figure 3 with the first stage to recover Line 2 (Figure 3c), 
the second to recover Line 1 (Figure 3d) and the last stage to recover Line 3 to its original state (Figure 3a).”
(x) The sub-section 2.4 should have the sub heading “Cost during disruption & recovery stage for a full Decision 
Making”, not for recovery stage only.
Reply:
We have replaced the sub-heading following the reviewer’s suggestion to “2.4 Cost during Disruption 
and Repair Stage for a Full Decision Making”
(xi) Typo is found at p-13 in the serial paper line number 282, “ticket prize” is written, which should be “ticket 
price”.
Reply:
We are sorry for the typo error.  The revised manuscript has been carefully checked to avoid such kind 
of error again. 
(xii) At p-14 in the paper line number 294, recovery function was taken as linear, which in real cases is hardly 
observed.
Reply:
The authors have to admit that such kind of recovery of passenger flow volume is hardly observed 
neither in linear form nor in other non-linear form.  It is difficult to evaluate precisely the recovery 
procedure for passenger flow even after the re-open of the recovered station.  However, for the 
recovery of multiple stations, it should make sense that the recovery of the passenger flow is a 
step function which can be approximately modelled by the linear function for simplicity in 
calculation.  Overall, for the purpose of the calculation of the disruption cost, the recovery curve of 
passenger flow volume is assumed to be linear as none of other nonlinear curves is evident. 
(xiii) At p-16 at paper line number 345, full form of “PV” is not mentioned.
Reply:
Ctotal, PV means the present value (PV) equal to the total cost Ctotal at time of full recovery (t = t1).  It 
should be less than the value of money exactly at present (Ctotal).  The text in page 16 has been revised 
and the notation Ctotal, PV is explained in detail in notations section. 
Line 400 – line 401: “…(present value equal to the total cost at time t1, i.e., Ctotal, PV)…”
Line 734: ” Ctotal, PV Present value equal to the total cost at time of recovery ”
6. Application of the Resilience Model….
(i) At p-19, paper line number 412, calculation of is not shown. Consequently, it makes it unclear for the readers.
Reply:
We are sorry to make the reviewer unclear about the calculation of network connectivity.  Basically, 
the network connectivity Ef is calculated based Eq. 6.  The node number N is 303 for an initial network 
without failure.  The path length dij for all pair nodes in the network is calculated by using the Floyd 
algorithm (Floyd, 1962) from the correlation matrix A.  Since the calculation requires repeated searches 
for shortest path length, a Matlab-based code is used.  The authors could share the Matlab function 
codes if the reviewer is interested. 
In addition, the text in the manuscript has been newly revised in:
Line 174 – line 177: “There are quite a number of classical algorithms to calculate the path length dij efficiently 
from the correlation matrix A, e.g., Dijkstra’s algorithm, Bellman-Ford algorithm, Floyd algorithm (Zhan and Noon, 
1998).”
Line 462 – line 466: “The initial network connectivity Ef without any failure is calculated by using Eq. 6, where 
the node number N is equal to 303 and the path length dij for all pair nodes in network is calculated by using the 
Floyd algorithm (Floyd, 1962).  The calculated Ef is equal to 0.0994.  After the disrupted node is removed, the 
similar procedure of calculation could be repeated for a disrupted network as described above.”
Reference:
Floyd, R.W., 1962. Algorithm 97 (Shortest Path). Communications of the Acm 5, 345-345.
Zhan, F.B., Noon, C.E., 1998. Shortest path algorithms: an evaluation using real road networks. Transportation science 32: 
65-73. 
(ii) At the same page in paper line number 420, inflection point is mentioned as 0.3. It is not clearly mentioned in 
the figure. In text, its significance is not discussed, as well how it is obtained?
Reply:
We appreciate the reviewer’s good suggestion on the elaboration of inflection point in Figure 10.  By 
drawing two extension lines for the two distinct stage of network efficiency shown in Figure 10 (the 
variation of network efficiency approximately appears to be linear for each stage), the intersection point 
could be regarded as the inflection point.  The inflection point for intentional attack is about 0.10, while 
for random attack is about 0.24.  Obviously, the inflection point for random attack is greatly moving to 
the right side of the inflection point for intentional attack.  It clearly shows the robustness of the metro 
network under the condition of random attack.  Correspondingly, the text has been revised in the 
manuscript in:
Line 478 – line 480: “By drawing two extension lines (black dash line in Figure 10) along these two distinct 
stages, the intersection of these two lines could be regarded as the inflection point.  ”
Line 485 – line 488: “The inflection point for random attack is greatly moving to the right side of the inflection 
point for intentional attack.  It clearly shows that the robustness of the metro network under the condition of random 
attack is much better than the robustness under the condition of intentional attack.”
In addition, Figure 10 is also re-drawn to explicitly show the inflection point.  
(iii) At p-20 in the paper line number 442, calculation of original connectivity is not shown.
Reply:
Thanks for the reviewer’s comment.  Details of the calculation for original connectivity could be referred 
to the response to comment (i) in 6. Application of the Resilience Model.
(iv) At p-22 in the paper line number 485, one small calculation of should be shown for better understanding by 
the readers.
Reply:
Thanks for the reviewer’s rigorous point of view on the calculation of resilience index Re. Basically, the 
calculation is carried out using Eq. 10.  A typical calculation example is newly added in the revised 
manuscript to explicitly show the calculation procedure for ease of understanding. 
Line 557 – line 563: “Considering the recovery sequence 2-6-9-4 as an example, the calculated initial network 
connectivity is equal to 0.0994, and the network connectivity after the disruption of the station is 0.0932.  After 
recovery according to the sequence 2-6-9-4, the network connectivity is gradually increased from 0.0932 to 0.0953 
(Line 2 is recovered), to 0.0973 (Lines 2 and 6 are recovered), to 0.0985 (Lines 2, 6 and 9 are recovered), and to 
0.0994 (fully recovered for Lines 2, 6, 9 and 4).  Hence, by using Eq. 10, the resilience index Re is  calculated to 
be 0.974, i.e., 0.974  = 0.5 × (0.0932 + 2 × 0.0953 + 2 × 0.0973 + 2 × 0.0985 + 2 × 0.0994) × 4 / (4×0.0994).”
(v) At p-22 in the paper line number 492, the significance of “Stage zero” has not been discussed.
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First of all, the authors are greatly appreciated for the reviewer’s insightful comments, which 
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meet the requirement of the journal. 
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225 1. Introduction
26 Urban rail transit systems (named subsequently as metro systems) offer an effective solution 
27 for addressing transportation problems in cities by significantly increasing the capacities of 
28 public transportation.  This benefit has driven an expeditious development in the construction 
29 and operation of metro systems in many metropolitan cities.  As the number of metro lines 
30 increases, metro systems often grow to a large and complex network scale.  For example, 
31 Shanghai has a metro system with 303 stations and 350 tunnels over 617km.  Although a large-
32 scale metro network makes public transportation attractive and convenient, any accident 
33 impacting this mega system would greatly affect not only the serviceability of this critical 
34 infrastructure but also the safety of passengers.  For example, in September of 2011, a signal 
35 failure occurred in a station of metro line 10 in Shanghai, China.  Two metro trains crashed in a 
36 tunnel due to the loss of signal causing 271 injured passengers and 30-hour halt of the whole 
37 metro line (Mu, 2011).  In view of these circumstances, the safety of metro networks is a key 
38 concern that requires an enhanced understanding of these networks through extensive research. 
39 Quite a number of studies have been carried out by analyzing networks for the safety of metro 
40 systems in particular with the topographical mapping modelling (Crucitti et al., 2003; Derrible 
41 and Kennedy, 2010; Watts and Strogatz, 1998; Zhang et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2011). 
42 Essentially, a metro network can be mapped into a topological graph with the simplification of 
43 metro tunnels and metro stations, respectively, as links and nodes used in topology (Zhang et al., 
44 2013).  Topological analysis, i.e., consisting of nodes and links, the path length and cluster 
45 coefficient of a network provides an effective and logical basis to characterize the safety of a 
46 transportation network (Derrible and Kennedy, 2010).  Watts and Strogatz (1998) proposed a 
47 model termed small-world network for complex network analysis.  The small-world network 
348 system is typically highly clustered and yet have small characteristic path lengths, which 
49 conceptually shows a robust connectivity of the nodes for a network subjected to any disruption.  
50 Barabasi and Albert (1999) investigated large-scale networks and found that the node 
51 connectivity in those networks, i.e., network connectivity, often follows a scale-free power-law 
52 distribution.  This result suggests that the connectivity of the network is robust under a random 
53 failure yet is vulnerable under an intentional attack. 
54 The above network assessment models, however, are mainly qualitative with conceptualized 
55 measures that do not offer a rigorous comparison of safety levels among networks. In this 
56 respect, network analysis with quantitative measures of robustness and vulnerability is thus 
57 helpful for examining the safety level of a specific network.  Albert et al. (2000) quantitatively 
58 analyzed the robustness of metro networks in the event of an accident.  The robustness of a metro 
59 network here is expressed in terms of the residual network connectivity after the disruption of 
60 nodes in the network.  Crucitti et al. (2004) also studied the robustness of two types of large-
61 scale networks, i.e., a random network and scale-free network, for the performance of network 
62 connectivity.  These two studies revealed that scale-free networks have a high robustness index 
63 under random attacks but a low robustness index under intentional attacks.  Recently, a similar 
64 analysis of the robustness of metro networks was also reported by Zhang et al. (2011) and Yang 
65 et al. (2015).  Additionally, disrupting a large-scale metro network by an accident affects not 
66 only the robustness but also the subsequent recovery.  Recovery profiles over time greatly affect 
67 the economic and social wellbeing outcomes that are of great concern to metro owners.  The 
68 rapid recovery of a network’s connectivity from a disrupted state to the normal state is a key 
69 concern among engineers (Francis and Bekera, 2014).  However, a robustness assessment 
70 focuses only on the network safety in the event of an accident without considering recovery.  In 
471 the context of recovery, robustness and vulnerability analyses are still insufficient to offer a 
72 rational recovery strategy in terms of recovery sequencing and duration for stations and tunnels 
73 in a metro network.  
74 A comprehensive safety assessment model includes both the network robustness and the 
75 recovery profile as provided by Ayyub (2014).  In this context, the concept of “resilience” would 
76 provide an appropriate solution to cover both the robustness and recovery in a single model for 
77 safety evaluation of a network system (Ayyub, 2015; Bruneau et al., 2003).  Resilience, 
78 according to U. S. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-21, 2013), means “the ability to prepare 
79 for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions.”  
80 Fundamentally, the resilience of a system is often quantified by relating it to a resilience loss 
81 triangle represented by the difference between a normal performance evolution curve and a 
82 disrupted performance curve along with the time duration of disruption and recovery stage 
83 (Frangopol and Soliman, 2015).  A resilient system can be quantitatively defined by the system 
84 with a minimized performance loss triangle, also termed resilience loss triangle.  The optimized 
85 recovery sequences and duration necessary to minimize the resilience triangle thus offer a basis 
86 for defining recovery strategies after disruptions (Zhang and Wang, 2016).  
87 The concept of resilience as used herein was initially and formally introduced by Holling 
88 (1973) for ecologic systems.  Later on, a broader interest in resilience was triggered by the 2001 
89 World Trade Center attack in the United States.  Typical uses of resilience analysis has covered 
90 mostly water resource systems (Hashimoto et al., 1982), power networks (Henry and Ramirez-
91 Marquez, 2012) and the seismic hazards for bridges (Dong and Frangopol, 2015).  Resilience 
92 analysis for urban rail transit systems, however, has been quite limited.  On the other hand, 
93 resilience analysis is of great necessity and importance in order to identify optimized recovery 
594 sequences after network disruptions.  One might realize that a metro network, to some degree, is 
95 similar to the power network but with a different topological space of nodes and links and a 
96 different recovery philosophy in terms of sequence and timing.  These similarities can be 
97 exploited in the development of respective approaches.  In addition, the current practice of 
98 recovery is purely based on empirical judgement without a rational model to obtain an optimum 
99 repair duration and costs during the recovery stage (Huang and Zhang, 2016).  
100 This paper provides a general framework for the resilience analysis of large-scale metro 
101 network systems that offers an immediate basis for identifying both the best recovery sequences 
102 to minimize the performance loss and the best repair duration to minimize the costs associated 
103 with disruption and recovery.  The performance of a metro network in this paper refers to the 
104 connectivity of stations in an integrated metro network (hereafter termed network connectivity).  
105 The development of this framework requires the introduction of several concepts and models in 
106 the context of metro networks as follows: 
107 1. Basic mapping of a metro network into a topological graph; 
108 2. Defining and measuring vulnerability and robustness of the topological metro network; 
109 3. Developing resiliency metrics based on the topological metro network; 
110 4. Accounting for costs during the disruption and recovery stage. 
111 The main body of the paper is provided in two subsequent primary sections.  The first primary 
112 section provides the detailed description of the resilience model according to the above four 
113 items.  The second primary section provides an application of the above resilience model to the 
114 Shanghai metro.  Recovery strategies are discussed for (a) a single multi-line station, and (b) 
115 multiple stations in terms of repair sequences that minimize the resilience loss triangle.  Then, a 
116 brief application example focusing on cost analysis during disruption and recovery is used to 
6117 illustrate the concepts introduced.  Finally, concluding remarks are presented.  Although the 
118 illustrative examples in this paper are based on the Shanghai metro, the proposed resiliency 
119 model is applicable for safety analysis of other complex metro networks, such as in London, 
120 New York, etc., with the emphasis on network robustness and recovery. 
121 2. Proposed General Framework: Resilience Models for Large Metro Networks
122 2.1 Topological Mapping of Metro Networks 
123 Several types of topological graphs are suitable to model transportation networks and systems 
124 based on the use of nodes and links among nodes.  von Ferber et al. (2009) summarized four 
125 types of topological graphs, specifically, L-space type, B-space type, P-space type and C-space 
126 type, for representing a typical bus transportation network.  Among all these models, preference 
127 is given to the L-space type graph for metro networks since it provides clear definitions in 
128 relation to transportation networks.  Nodes stand for bus stops and links among nodes stand for 
129 connections between two successive bus stops of a bus line.  A similar treatment can be adopted 
130 for a metro system as graphically illustrated in Figure 1.  Figure 1a shows an example of a metro 
131 network.  Each node represents a metro station, while a link between nodes stands for a metro 
132 tunnel.  Different metro lines are marked with different colors.  Figure 1b is a typical L-space 
133 topological graph for the metro network shown in Figure 1a.
134 A topological graph for a metro network can be expressed by a vector G:
135 [ , ]G S E (1)
136 where S is the node set for all the stations in a metro network, denoted as S=[si׀i=1, 2, 3, …, N] 
137 (N is the total number of stations), and E is the set of links for all the tunnels in the metro 
138 network, denoted as E=[eij׀i, j∈S].  The state of connection between any two nodes in a network 
139 can be represented by a correlation matrix A, denoted as A=[aij]N×N.  If nodes si and sj are not 
7140 connected directly, then aij is equal to infinity.  If there is a link between them, then aij is equal to 
141 one.  If i is equal to j, then aij represents the connection of a node with itself, which is set to zero.  
142 In the topological analysis of the metro system in this paper, factors such as upper and lower 
143 lines, link distance between stations, departure frequency of metro trains, passenger capacity and 
144 the political reasons are not weighted in the network.  The model used essentially results in an 
145 undirected and unweighted network system, which is frequently used to represent the 
146 transportation network system.  
147 For the topological network of a metro system, the node degree ki stands for the number of 
148 nodes that have a direct connection with the node si.  The average degree k* is defined as the 
149 average of the node degrees ki for all nodes in the network.  The minimum number of nodes that 
150 need to be passed through from node si to node sj is named path length dij.  There are quite a 
151 number of classical algorithms to calculate the path length dij efficiently from the correlation 
152 matrix A, e.g., Dijkstra’s algorithm, Bellman-Ford algorithm, Floyd algorithm (Zhan and Noon, 
153 1998).  The characteristic path length L is defined as the average over all path lengths dij for all 
154 pairs of nodes (si, sj) in a network:
155 1
( 1) iji j
L d
N N 
   (2)
156 Correspondingly, the diameter of a network D is defined as the maximum path length dij 
157 among all pairs of nodes (si, sj).  The clustering coefficient Ci is defined as the ratio of the 
158 number of links ei between node si and its adjacent total of ki nodes with respect to the maximum 
159 possible number of links ki(ki-1)/2:
160  1 / 2ii i i
eC
k k
  (3)
8161 The network-clustering coefficient C is the mean of all clustering coefficients Ci for all the 
162 nodes.
163 By using the above basic notations, two typical properties of a topological network can be 
164 characterized; the small-world property and the scale-free property.  A small-world network is a 
165 network that has a high network clustering coefficient C but is characterized by a small path 
166 length L.  A network is called a small-world network if
167 *
ln( )
ln( )
NL
k
＞ (4a)
168
*kC
N
 (4b)
169 From a physical point of view, a small-world network possesses a reasonable local connectivity 
170 (Barabasi and Albert, 1999).  The scale-free network is a network that has a distribution of node 
171 degrees P(k), i.e., the relative frequency of node degree k, following a power distribution:
172 ( )=P k k
  (5)
173 where the parameters α and γ are the regressed coefficients for the power curve of a specific 
174 network.  The value of γ usually ranges from 2.1 to 4.0 (Barabasi and Albert, 1999).  Generally 
175 speaking, the power distribution of node degree means that the network has a few nodes with 
176 large node degrees, and most of the nodes possess small node degrees. 
177 2.2 Robustness and Vulnerability of Metro Networks
178 For a large-scale metro network, the connectivity from one station to another should be a key 
179 criterion for metro operation.  Once a metro network experiences a disrupting event, whether due 
180 to degradation, human errors or intentional attack, the node connectivity would inevitably 
181 decrease.  The robustness of a metro network is its ability to resist and maintain residual node 
182 connectivity after such an event.  Hence, before evaluating network robustness, the node 
9183 connectivity needs to be characterized first.  The network efficiency Ef is usually defined as an 
184 indicator to quantify the node connectivity of a topological network (Latora and Marchiori, 
185 2001):
186
1 1
1f i j ij
E
N(N ) d
   (6)
187 where dij is the path length between nodes si and sj.  The inverse of path length dij essentially 
188 means the connectivity efficiency between nodes si and sj in a network.  Hence, it is clear from 
189 Eq. 6 that the meaning of network efficiency Ef is the average of node efficiency for all nodes in 
190 a network.  The value of Ef could range from zero to one, i.e., zero means no connectivity 
191 between any two nodes in the network, whereas one means any two nodes are connected.  This 
192 specifies the lower and upper bounds for network connectivity.  
193 Theoretically speaking, the connectivity of a topographical metro network could be affected 
194 by failures both from metro stations (nodes) and from metro tunnels (links). In this paper, the 
195 failure of metro stations is specifically considered but not the links.  The key reason is that the 
196 metro station is open to the public and thus vulnerable to attacks or other hazards.  In addition, 
197 the failure of a network node is often considered in L-space type topological graphs for 
198 transportation networks (Yang et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2011).  The failure of a metro station 
199 can be classified into two types.  The first failure type occurs randomly and is caused possibly by 
200 natural hazards, power and signal malfunction or even human errors.  The probability of 
201 occurrence of such a failure can be assumed to be the same for all stations in a network. This 
202 assumption can be changed and varied values used without affecting the overall approach 
203 although the computationally complexity increases. The second type of failure is of an 
204 intentional nature as caused mainly on purpose by arson or terrorism.  Usually, the most 
205 important station in a large-scale network, e.g., a multi-line interchange, could be intentionally 
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206 targeted and disrupted.  For topological analysis, the failure of a station can be modeled by 
207 removing the node from the network.  As for the random failure, the node is removed randomly 
208 following a specific probability distribution function (Crucitti et al., 2004).  As for the intentional 
209 failure, assuming that attacks occur in the order of importance of the nodes, the nodes are 
210 removed sequentially following a descending order of magnitude of the node degree k (Crucitti 
211 et al., 2004).  
212 Hence, the metric of robustness of a topological metro network can be quantitatively 
213 described by the changed connectivity after the removal of a network node:
214
' 1 1
1f i j ij
E
N'(N' ) d'
   (7)
215 where N’ is the number of nodes after the removal of failed nodes, and d’ij is the newly calculated 
216 path length between nodes si and sj.  Correspondingly, the vulnerability of the topological metro 
217 network can be calculated by the decrease of connectivity due to the failure of nodes:
218
'
f f fV E E E    (8)
219 As for a node removal strategy, only one node is removed at a time.  Then the changed 
220 connectivity E’f and vulnerability V are calculated as the robustness and vulnerability of the 
221 network, respectively.  Hence, the magnitudes of robustness and vulnerability of a network 
222 depend on the node that is disrupted. By examining all the nodes, one at a time, robustness and 
223 vulnerability could indicate the order of importance of these metro stations for the network.  
224 2.3 Resilience of Metro Networks
225 The resilience of a metro network as discussed in this paper is defined as the connectivity level 
226 after the node disruption and the ability of rapid recovery of the connectivity to an acceptable 
227 level with appropriate repair measures.  The concept of the “resilience triangle” is often used for 
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228 infrastructure networks as proposed by Bruneau et al. (2003) to quantify the loss of resilience 
229 after performance disruption.  Figure 2 shows an example of such a resilience triangle shaded in 
230 grey.  The vertical axis stands for the performance index Q(t) of the network, while the 
231 horizontal axis is the time t.  The system performance is disrupted at time t0.  With particular 
232 recovery measures applied in a time interval of th, the performance can be recovered to the 
233 original level at time t1 (i.e., t1=t0+th).  Then, the resilience triangle is illustrated by the difference 
234 between the area covered by constant Q0 for the undisrupted system and the area covered by 
235 varied Q(t) for the disrupted system within time th.  Furthermore, the area covered by Q(t) for the 
236 disrupted system in this period (yellow shaded in Figure 2) is an indicator for resilience of the 
237 system subjected to the disruption at time t0.  Hence, on the basis of the resilience triangle, 
238 Bocchini and Frangopol (2012) proposed a general metric of resilience for bridge network 
239 infrastructure as:
240
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241 The resilience index Re is essentially the ratio of the area covered by the disrupted performance 
242 curve Q(t) (yellow shaded area in Figure 2) with respect to the area covered by the undisrupted 
243 curve (constant Q0 in the example of Figure 2) within the period of th.  Hence, the metric of 
244 resilience for a metro network can be represented by Eq. 9 with the performance Q(t) referring to 
245 the network efficiency Ef.  Hence, the resilience index Re can be expressed as:
246
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(10)
247 where Ef(t) stands for the network efficiency at time t, and Ef0 is the initial network efficiency for 
248 the original metro network where no disruption has occurred. 
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249 When the connectivity of the network after removal of nodes needs to be recovered, a 
250 sequential recovery strategy is usually assumed in the resilience analysis (Henry and Ramirez-
251 Marquez, 2012), i.e., only one metro station for one metro line could be recovered at a time.  In a 
252 large-scale metro network such as the Shanghai metro system, some of the metro stations are 
253 multi-line exchange stations as shown in Figure 3a.  When losing the functionality of such 
254 stations, the recovery of connectivity for different metro lines in this station also needs to be 
255 implemented sequentially.  Specifically, if the exchange station connects m lines, there are m 
256 stages in sequence to fully recover this station.  Hence, in total, the number of optional sequences 
257 is equal to P(m,m) (i.e., m-permutations of m).  As for the example shown in Figure 3b, in total, 
258 there are six optional sequences to fully recover the three-line exchange station A (i.e., 6=3×2×1).  
259 A typical sequence is shown in Figure 3 with the first stage to recover Line 2 (Figure 3c), the 
260 second to recover Line 1 (Figure 3d) and the last stage to recover Line 3 to its original state 
261 (Figure 3a).  Each recovery sequence corresponds to a specific resilience index Re.  Hence, an 
262 optimal decision for a recovery strategy is to find the best sequence for recovery that maximizes 
263 the value of Re.  Take the example of recovery of node A shown in Figure 3, the performance 
264 recovery curves corresponding to the six optional recovery sequences are plotted in Figure 4.  
265 Engineers thus could select sequence 5 as the optimal recovery strategy because it is associated 
266 with the largest resilience index Re.  For the case of several damaged nodes the procedure applies 
267 accordingly.
268 2.4 Disruption and Repair Costs for Decision Making 
269 The recovery of network connectivity is a primary goal for decision makers; however, disruption 
270 and repair costs associated with recovery profiles a key criterion in decision making.  Once the 
271 recovery sequence is selected, the particulars of recovery plans, i.e., repair methods, equipment, 
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272 etc., affect the repair duration and subsequently the recovery cost.  Generally, advanced 
273 techniques for repair work require less time to complete recovery task, but at a greater cost.  
274 Hence, a recovery cost analysis in terms of repair time duration helps to determine the optimized 
275 cost of repair.  Similar to other published resilience models, such as (Francis and Bekera, 2014), 
276 the proposed model for the resilience of metro networks so far does not incorporate the cost-
277 benefit analysis directly in the decision-making process of selecting an appropriate repair 
278 sequence.  As an extension, this section proposes a general cost analysis model in conceptual 
279 terms.  Note that the cost analysis here is discussed based on the selected optimum repair 
280 sequence by using the above resilience model.  Following the basic model proposed by Henry 
281 and Ramirez-Marquez (2012), the total cost Ctotal during the disruption and repair stages is 
282 generally composed of two parts, namely the cost Cdisruption and the cost Crepairs, represented as:
283 total disruption repairC C C  (11)
284 where the Cdisruption is referred to the cost or income loss due to the disruption of network 
285 connectivity and the Crepairs means the cost or investment for the repair works.  Taking the flood-
286 induced failure of metro station as an example, the Cdisruption might include two major categories, 
287 i.e., damaged but repairable equipment and damaged but non-repairable equipment, and income 
288 loss due to closing of metro operations.  Once a station is set as disrupted by flooding, the 
289 equipment such as track barriers, escalator, signal board and etc., could be partially or totally 
290 disabled.  Later on, the control rooms and power plant rooms might also be affected due to 
291 flooding.  Furthermore, when the metro station is completely closed, loss in income from ticket 
292 sales, the retails and other business around the metro stations comes on top.  In addition, the 
293 stocks or reputation of the metro company could be affected due to the disruptions.  Details of 
294 the above disruption cost are shown in Table 1.  However, incorporating all the factors shown in 
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295 Table 1 for disruption cost Cdisruption requires data that are not available in some cases.  For ease 
296 of discussion, the cost analysis for Cdisruption in this paper includes mainly the income loss in the 
297 ticket sales Cticket (Cdisruption = Cticket in this paper) which can be quantitatively evaluated.  Some 
298 other cost factors in Table 1 could be related qualitatively to the ticket income using perhaps 
299 multiplication coefficients (Cothers = λ×Cticket) as an example. 
300 It is reasonable to assume that the income loss in metro ticket sales Cticket is closely related to 
301 the loss of network connectivity.  In other words, the loss of system performance in terms of 
302 network connectivity directly affects the passenger volume (Vol) of the network, in particular in 
303 and around the disrupted stations.  The passenger volume would further affect the income from 
304 the ticket sales I.  In that case, the ticket income cost Cticket is assumed to have a positive 
305 correlation with the loss of passenger volume by a linear model.  As mentioned previously, the 
306 disruption cost Cdisruption in this paper is assumed to be equal to ticket income loss Cticket.  Hence, 
307 the Cdisruption is assumed as below:
308 disruption ticket LossC C Vol   (12)
309 where VolLoss is the total loss of the passenger volume during the whole disruption period, and β 
310 is the average metro ticket price of the network.  Similar to the network connectivity, the 
311 passenger volume Vol will experience a sharp reduction once a metro station is attacked or 
312 removed from the network at time t0.  This reduction from the initial state of Voln to a disrupted 
313 state Vold will be gradually recovered during the repair measures to the final recovered state at 
314 time t1.  Hence the passenger volume Vol(t) is also a function of time t between the failure time t0 
315 and the final recovered time t1.  Figure 5a shows two examples of linear and step functions of 
316 recovery of passenger volume Vol.  Corresponding to the passenger volume recovery, the 
317 operation income is also recovered due to the increase of passenger volume, from the income Id 
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318 under disruption to the fully recovered value of income In.  This effect is captured by a 
319 multiplication factor corresponding to the average ticket price β, see Eq. 12.  Figure 5b shows the 
320 two types of variation of operation income from Id to In.  In Figure 5, the shaded area 
321 corresponds to the total passenger volume loss VolLoss (Figure 5a) and the total cost of operation 
322 income loss Cdisruption (Figure 5b), respectively.  If the recovery function of passenger volume Vol 
323 is assumed to be linear, then the passenger volume loss can be represented as:
324
  1 012Loss n dVol Vol Vol t t   (13a)
325 and the total cost of disruption of system performance Cdisruption is:
326
  1 012disruption n dC Vol Vol t t   (13b)
327 This cost model does include indirect losses such as costs associated with longer travel times, 
328 costs associated with increased demands on other transportation systems, costs attributed to 
329 impacts on reputation and confidence in the system, etc. A complete accounting of all of these 
330 effects requires simulating the dynamics of the system with the passengers and other 
331 transportation modes.
332 Given an existing large-scale metro network, the average ticket price β and the initial 
333 passenger volume Voln are known.  After a node failure at time t0, the disrupted passenger 
334 volume Vold can also be predetermined for the disrupted system.  Hence, the only variable in Eq. 
335 13b that governs the cost Cdisruption is the time t1 that is needed to recover the system to its initial 
336 state, i.e., removed nodes are all repaired.  Note that the time t1 is positively correlated with the 
337 cost Cdisruption, e.g., a positive linear relationship could be found in the above example of linear 
338 model (Eq. 13).  It is obvious that the longer the repair works last, the greater the cost is.  
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339 The cost for the implementation of repair measures Crepair is determined by solving a typical 
340 time-cost trade-off problem within the discipline of engineering economics (Golzarpoor, 2012; 
341 Hegazy, 1999; Liu et al., 1995).  The total cost of repair works consists of the direct cost and the 
342 indirect cost, as shown in Figure 6.  The direct cost is related to the salary of workers, 
343 consumption of engineering materials, rental of the engineering machinery etc.  Some typical 
344 direct cost is shown in Table 1.  For a certain repair project, shortening the repair duration t can 
345 be achieved by an increase of salary, the use of high quality materials, and more machinery.  
346 Hence, the direct cost is believed to have a negative correlation with the repair time duration t as 
347 shown by the red dashed line in Figure 6.  The indirect cost is caused by social related factors 
348 (also shown in Table 1), which is believed to have a positive correlation with the time duration t, 
349 as indicated by the blue dashed line in Figure 6.  It is widely recognized that the detailed 
350 evaluation of direct and indirect cost is quite complicated and specifically case-oriented 
351 (Golzarpoor, 2012).  Hence, the cost Crepair is represented by a non-monotonic and nonlinear 
352 function of repair duration t1 without loss of generality, as shown in Figure 13, marked as black 
353 solid line, from which an optimum value of t1 that minimizes the Crepair can be found (point A in 
354 Figure 6).  
355 Hence, by substituting the above expressions for Cdisruption and Crepair into Eq. 11, the total cost 
356 Ctotal becomes:
357
  1 0 11 ( )2total n d repairC Vol Vol t t C t    (14a)
358 Figure 7 shows a graphical representation of Eq. 14a by plotting the total cost Ctotal against the 
359 repair duration t1.  Again, for a particular large-scale metro network under a specific case of 
360 disruption and recovery, the dominant variable in Eq. 14a is the repair duration t1.  Similar to the 
361 non-monotonic function of Crepair, the total cost Ctotal is also a non-monotonic function of time t1.  
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362 To minimize Ctotal is again a typical time-cost trade-off problem.  Interestingly, it is not always 
363 the case that a shorter recovery is associated with a smaller total cost.  The optimum value of t1 
364 that minimizes the total cost of recovery needs to be determined by solving the time-cost trade-
365 off problem illustrated in Figure 7 with point B being the solution.  Since the total cost includes 
366 the operation income loss (first term on the right-hand side of Eq. 14a), the optimum value of t1 
367 is smaller than the value of time t that minimizes Crepair, i.e., t1, B in Figure 7 is smaller than t1, A 
368 in Figure 6.  
369 If the disruption is quite serious, the duration of full recovery can take several years or even 
370 longer.  For example, the reported disruption of metro lines in Shanghai due to deformational 
371 performance took almost six years to be fully recovered (Huang and Zhang, 2016) and the 
372 disruption of metro lines in St. Petersburg due to seepage in tunnels takes almost eight years of 
373 recovery (Ryumin, 2004).  In those cases, the factor of time-value of money should be included 
374 in the cost analysis at the present time.  In the simplest model for time-value of money a constant 
375 discount rate i is assumed (Brigham and Ehrhardt, 2002), and Eq. 14a is modified to: 
376
     1, 1 0 1
1 1( )
2 1total PV n d repair t
C Vol Vol t t C t
i
         (14b)
377 It is clear from Eq. 14b that the total cost with full recovery at time t1 (present value equal to 
378 the total cost at time t1, i.e., Ctotal, PV) is less than the value of money at present (Ctotal).  A 
379 generalized illustration of the comparison between Ctotal, PV and Ctotal is also plotted in Figure 7.  
380 The corresponding optimum value of t1 might move forward due to the effect of time value of 
381 money as the point D shown in Figure 7. Owner or practitioner with the responsibility for the 
382 repair and maintenance works of large-scale metro networks should undertake such cost analysis.  
383 After determining the optimal repair sequence by the resilience analysis model as shown in 
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384 Figure 4, the optimal repair duration for each station could be obtained from the above cost 
385 analysis.  Therefore, the best recovery strategy due to the disruption can be achieved both with 
386 the best recovery sequence and duration.  At the present stage, it should be noted that the detailed 
387 evaluation for each parameter in Eq. 14b is limited to typical scenario where both the data from 
388 disruption and recovery could be collected.  
389 3. Application: Shanghai Metro System
390 The Shanghai metro system now is the longest metro network system in the world by the 
391 route length.  Up to December 31, 2015, the total length of the 14 Shanghai metro lines in 
392 operation was 617km with 303 metro stations.  These numbers exclude the operating magnetic 
393 train line that only has a departure station and an arrival station.  The planned and being-
394 constructed metro lines and stations are also excluded from these values.  For planning reasons, 
395 Metro lines 3 and 4 in Shanghai partially share the same line and metro stations along the line.  
396 Those shared metro stations and lines are considered only once in building the network as 
397 described in this paper.  The necessity of a detailed resilience analysis for such a huge-scaled 
398 network is quite obvious from this perspective. 
399 3.1 Topological Characteristics of the Shanghai Metro
400 A typical L-space topological network representing the Shanghai metro system is built and 
401 plotted in Figure 8.  The nodes in Figure 8 represent the metro stations, and the links between 
402 nodes are the metro lines.  The correlation matrix A is built for all 303 stations in this network, 
403 A=[aij]303×303.  Based on the correlation matrix A, the characteristics of the metro network, i.e., 
404 average degree k*, characteristic path length L and network diameter D, are calculated by using 
405 the algorithm proposed by Floyd (1962).  Table 2 displays these typical characteristics for the 
406 Shanghai metro network.  
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407 The average node degree k* is equal to 2.31, which indicates that every station is connected to 
408 2.31 other stations on average.  Note that a node degree k equal to one refers to an endpoint of a 
409 single line.  A k equal to two characterizes an intermediate normal station where only one metro 
410 line passes through.  A value of k larger than two indicates an exchange station for at least two 
411 lines in a metro system.  Figure 9a shows the histogram for the distribution of node degrees for 
412 the 303 stations, represented by the solid black column.  In total, about 76% of the metro stations 
413 are normal stations passed by one metro line.  The remaining 24%, i.e., 52 stations, are multi-line 
414 exchange stations.  For comparison, the distribution of node degrees for the Shanghai metro 
415 system from 2010 is plotted in the grey column in Figure 9a based on data extracted from Zhang 
416 et al. (2011).  It can be seen that the relative frequency for the node degree equal to 2 is smaller 
417 in 2015, while the values for node degree equal to 4, 5 or 6 are larger.  Furthermore, the largest 
418 value of node degree k is equal to 8, which means that four metro lines pass through this station.  
419 The largest k in the year of 2010 is equal to 7.  This indicates the fast development of the 
420 Shanghai metro network during these five years from 2010 to 2015.  
421 Figure 9b shows a plot with logarithmically scaled axes for both the node degree k and the 
422 relative frequency p(k), corresponding to Figure 9a for the case of 2015.  The plot provides some 
423 indication that the relationship between the logarithm of relative frequency p(k) and the 
424 logarithm of node degree k can be approximated in a linear manner.  This corresponds to a power 
425 curve for the distribution of the node degree k.  Linear regression yields the parameters α=3.858 
426 and γ=3.525.  Hence, it is indicated that the Shanghai metro network is a scale-free network, 
427 which corresponds to robustness of the network for random failure but vulnerability of the 
428 network for an intentional failure (Albert et al., 2000; Crucitti et al., 2003; Crucitti et al., 2004).  
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429 The characteristic path length L shown in Table 2 is equal to 14.87, which indicates that the 
430 shortest path between any two stations in the network needs to pass 14.87 stations from an 
431 average perspective.  The network diameter D is equal to 41, which stands for the longest metro 
432 line with 41 metro stations.  The calculated network cluster coefficient C is 0.0082.  Table 2 also 
433 displays the calculated path length limit of 6.82 (ln N / ln k*) and the limit for the network cluster 
434 coefficient C as 0.0076 for concluding whether the network is a small-world network or not, see 
435 Eq. 4.  Both criteria indicate that the Shanghai metro network is a small-world network.  From 
436 the definition of small-world given by Milgram (1967), the Shanghai metro network is proved to 
437 have an intensive connectivity locally and a good quality of operation for the whole network.
438 3.2 Robustness and Vulnerability Evaluation of Shanghai Metro 
439 The initial network connectivity Ef without any failure is calculated by using Eq. 6, where the 
440 node number N is equal to 303 and the path length dij for all pair nodes in network is calculated 
441 by using the Floyd algorithm (Floyd, 1962).  The calculated Ef is equal to 0.0994.  After the 
442 disrupted node is removed, the similar procedure of calculation could be repeated for a disrupted 
443 network as described above.  The robustness of the Shanghai metro is calculated for both types 
444 of failure scenarios, random failure and intentional failure, corresponding to the respective node 
445 removal strategies.  For random failure, stations are removed randomly following a discrete 
446 uniform distribution over the stations.  The network connectivity Ef,random is calculated using Eqs. 
447 6 and 7 after each station removal.  For intentional failure, the stations are removed in the order 
448 of descending node degree.  The network connectivity Ef,intention is calculated after each station 
449 removal.  
450 Figure 10 shows the calculated Ef,random (green line with solid triangle) and Ef,intention (blue line 
451 with solid rectangle) against the fraction of removed stations in the network.  The constant 
21
452 dashed line stands for the calculated initial network connectivity Ef (i.e., 0.0994) without failure 
453 of any station.  It is observed that the decrease of Ef,intention with the growing fraction of removed 
454 nodes experiences two distinct stages. First there is a sharp decrease at the beginning followed by 
455 a more gentle decrease once a number of stations have already failed.  By drawing two extension 
456 lines (black dash line in Figure 10) along these two distinct stages, the intersection of these two 
457 lines could be regarded as the inflection point.  The inflection point shown in Figure 10 is around 
458 the fraction of removed nodes equal to 0.10.  This fraction of removed nodes is approximately 
459 the fraction of nodes in the network with node degree greater than 3, see Figure 9a.  This is a 
460 clear indication for the importance of those multi-line exchange stations for the connectivity of 
461 the metro network.  Similarly, the decrease of Ef,random also shows these two stages, as well, with 
462 the inflection point at around 0.24.  The inflection point for random attack is greatly moving to 
463 the right side of the inflection point for intentional attack.  It clearly shows that the robustness of 
464 the metro network under the condition of random attack is much better than the robustness under 
465 the condition of intentional attack.  But the curve for Ef,random is less sharp compared to the curve 
466 for Ef,intention due to the large value at the inflection point for random failure.  Hence, the 
467 Shanghai metro network when subjected to the random failure of stations is more robust than the 
468 network when subjected to intentional attacks.  This result is consistent with the general 
469 conclusions for scale-free networks and supports our hypothesis that the Shanghai metro is a 
470 scale-free network.  Further, when the fraction of removed stations is greater than 35%, Ef,intention 
471 is slightly larger than Ef,random since the random removal leaves some  exchange stations for 
472 removal in later stages causing a slightly stronger decrease of connectivity in those stages.  
473 For comparison, the results based on the data of the network in 2010 are also represented in 
474 Figure 10.  The grey line with hollow triangles illustrates the random removal strategy, while the 
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475 red line with hollow rectangles indicates the intentional removal strategy.  By comparing the 
476 results for 2015 and 2010, both the Ef,random and Ef,intention for 2015 are slightly larger than those 
477 for 2010, especially when the fraction of removed nodes is small.  This suggests that the 
478 robustness, in particular at the beginning of removal stages, has been increased by the five-year 
479 development of the metro network from 2010 to 2015.  Furthermore, the network connectivity in 
480 2010 under intentional removal would be close to zero when 40% of stations are removed, which 
481 shows high vulnerability of the network.  This issue has been resolved by 2015.  
482 The vulnerability of the initial network subjected to only one node removal is calculated by 
483 using Eq. 8 for all the 303 nodes.  The ten most critical stations, identified by the largest V 
484 calculated from Eq. 8, are displayed in Table 3.  The Caoyang Road station is ranked most 
485 critical station in the network.  If this station is removed, the connectivity would be reduced by 
486 0.0073, which is about 7.4% of the value of original connectivity Ef (0.0994).  Inspecting the ten 
487 most critical stations in Table 3 it appears that these stations do not necessarily have a large node 
488 degree k (last column in Table 3).  The stations with node degree equal to six are not ranked in 
489 the top ten most critical stations.  Apart from the Century Ave station with k equal to 8, all the 
490 other stations have a node degree k of 5 or less.  This result shows that the vulnerability of a 
491 network due to one-node removal is not significantly correlated with the node degree k (Hu, 
492 2007).  
493 The specific locations of the ten most critical stations are marked in the network map in 
494 Figure 8.  Analyzing this map it becomes obvious that most of the critical nodes are located in a 
495 position where the node is the only connection between the suburban and the downtown area.  
496 Furthermore, the suburb metro lines still have a significant number of stations beyond the critical 
497 stations.  Once such a critical node is removed, the entire connection between downtown and the 
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498 respective suburb would be completely disrupted.  This is the key reason for the vulnerability of 
499 the Shanghai metro.  As a conclusion, a new circle line should be implemented into the network 
500 to remove this criticality.  On the other hand, the nodes with a node degree k equal to 6 are 
501 mostly located in the downtown area.  Since the network in the downtown area is much denser 
502 than that in the suburban area, even removal of such node with large k does not affect the 
503 network connectivity badly. Once such node is removed, there are still sufficient options for 
504 connecting through alternative lines.
505 3.3 Resilience Evaluation of Shanghai Metro 
506 It is clear from Figure 4 that the resilience of a network highly depends on the recovery 
507 strategy, e.g., sequence of recovery for multiple disrupted nodes and sequence of recovery for 
508 multiple lines in an exchange station.  Furthermore, repair duration should be optimized on the 
509 basis of minimizing the disruption and repair costs.  The philosophy behind the recovery strategy 
510 for a disrupted metro system is first to select the best recovery sequence either for an exchange 
511 station or for multiple stations and second to select the best repair duration considering both the 
512 disruption and repair cost.  In this regard, the following section shows an example of three 
513 typical cases of the resilience analysis of the Shanghai metro network: Case 1 is to obtain the 
514 best recovery sequence for a disrupted exchange station; Case 2 is to obtain the best recovery 
515 sequence for multiple disrupted stations; and Case 3 is to obtain the best repair duration for 
516 rebuilding a disrupted metro station.  
517 Case 1: Recovery sequence given disruption of one multi-line exchange station
518 This analysis concentrates on the station with the largest node degree in the network, i.e. 
519 Century Ave station connecting four metro lines, namely line 2, 4, 6 and 9, leading to a node 
520 degree of 8. The robustness analysis indicated that the vulnerability of the network is 
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521 significantly determined by possible disruption of this station.  That is, this station plays an 
522 important role for the connectivity of the network, see Figure 11.  High resilience is thus required 
523 for this station.  The key question is the decision for the best recovery strategy. There are 24 
524 possible recovery sequences to fully recover all four lines in this station, i.e., 24 = P(4, 4) = 
525 4×3×2×1.  Each sequence corresponds to a specific resilience index Re representing the recovery 
526 of network connectivity.  A decision has to be made for that recovery sequence that maximizes 
527 the value of Re among the 24 choices.  For carrying out the resilience analysis, we assume that 
528 the recovery time for each line in this station is the same no matter what kind of recovery 
529 measures are applied.  On this basis, the difference of Re between the possible sequences is 
530 solely affected by the sequence of recovering metro lines in this station and not by any other 
531 factors.  Subsequently, the recovery sequences are denoted using the metro line numbers, such as 
532 2-6-9-4 indicating that first line 2 is recovered, then line 6 and so on. 
533 The resilience index Re is calculated, using Eq. 10, for the 24 possible recovery sequences.  
534 Considering the recovery sequence 2-6-9-4 as an example, the calculated initial network 
535 connectivity is equal to 0.0994, and the network connectivity after the disruption of the station is 
536 0.0932.  After recovery according to the sequence 2-6-9-4, the network connectivity is gradually 
537 increased from 0.0932 to 0.0953 (Line 2 is recovered), to 0.0973 (Lines 2 and 6 are recovered), 
538 to 0.0985 (Lines 2, 6 and 9 are recovered), and to 0.0994 (fully recovered for Lines 2, 6, 9 and 4).  
539 Hence, by using Eq. 10, the resilience index Re is  calculated to be 0.974, i.e., 0.974  = 0.5 × 
540 (0.0932 + 2 × 0.0953 + 2 × 0.0973 + 2 × 0.0985 + 2 × 0.0994) × 4 / (4×0.0994).  The results are 
541 listed in Table 4.  The largest Re shown in Table 4 is equal to 0.974, which is produced by the 
542 recovery sequence 2-6-9-4.  It indicates that if Century Ave station is totally disrupted, the first 
543 metro line to be recovered is line 2, followed by line 6, then line 9, and line 4.  On the other hand, 
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544 the smallest Re is obtained as 0.962 for the recovery sequence of 9-4-6-2.  The curves illustrating 
545 the change of the network efficiency over these two recovery sequences are plotted in Figure 12.  
546 The black line with solid squares reflects the recovery sequence 2-6-9-4, while the grey line with 
547 hollow circles represents the recovery sequence 9-4-6-2.  Stage zero stands for a metro network 
548 in its normal state without any disruption.  The initial network efficiency as calculated in the 
549 robustness analysis is about 0.0994.  Stage 1 stands for the removal of the station causing the 
550 sharp reduction of network efficiency to 0.0932.  After four stages, the station is fully recovered 
551 with a network efficiency restored to 0.0994 corresponding to the initial or normal condition.  It 
552 is quite obvious from Figure 12 that after each intermediate recovery stage, i.e., stage 2-4, the 
553 network efficiency for sequence 2-6-9-4 is larger than that for sequence 9-4-6-2.  Hence, the 
554 resilience loss triangle for sequence 2-6-9-4 is much smaller than that for sequence 9-4-6-2.  The 
555 difference between the resilience triangles is shaded in red color in Figure 12.  It indicates the 
556 extent to which resilience of this station is influenced by decision margins regarding the recovery 
557 sequence and that the sequence 2-6-9-4 is the best choice.  Following this principle, the best 
558 recovery strategy for each of the 52 exchange stations can be determined.  Table 5 shows the best 
559 recovery strategy for each exchange station in Shanghai based on the resilience analysis.  This 
560 result may be helpful for decision making when any of the stations is affected and waiting for 
561 recovery.
562 Case 2: Recovery sequence given disruption of multiple stations 
563 For the case of multi-station disruption, the removal of four nodes at once is taken as an 
564 example.  Two typical sub-cases are discussed: (I) with different node degree k values for the 
565 four nodes, and (II) with the same node degree k for the four nodes.  For multiple stations, in 
566 order to show the effect of recovery sequence of different stations clearly, the recovery sequence 
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567 of metro lines for an exchange station discussed previously is not considered.  In other words, 
568 any of the removed stations is fully recovered only by one stage without considering the 
569 sequence of recovering different lines.  
570 For Sub-case I, the Century Ave station (node 43), Peoples’ Square station (node 13), 
571 Oriental Sports Center station (node 133) and Shanghai railway station (node 16) are selected 
572 with their corresponding node degree k equal to 8, 6, 5 and 4, respectively.  Again, there are 24 
573 possible recovery sequences, i.e., 24 = P(4, 4).  The recovery sequences are denoted using the 
574 station numbers, i.e. 43-13-133-16 for recovery in the order of stations as named above.  The 
575 resilience index Re for each of the recovery sequences is calculated by Eq. 10.  Hence, there are 
576 24 calculated index values Re as shown in Table 6.  The maximum value of Re is calculated based 
577 on the sequence 16-43-133-13 which is the best choice according to the resilience measure.  It is 
578 quite interesting that the best recovery sequence is not based on the descending order of the node 
579 degree k as 43-13-133-16.  Instead, the best recovery sequence reflects the order of nodes ranked 
580 according to their criticality for network vulnerability based on the robustness analysis.  The key 
581 criterion is the contribution of node to the network connectivity, and hence to the network 
582 efficiency Ef, rather than the node degree k.  The minimum value of the Re is obtained as 0.885 
583 for sequence 13-133-43-16, which is 5% less than the maximum value of Re under the sequence 
584 16-43-133-13.  The difference of the index Re between these two sequences corresponds to the 
585 difference in the resilience loss triangle produced by the curves of recovered network efficiency 
586 along the specific recovery sequence, as shown in Figure 13.  
587 For Sub-case II with four removed nodes having the same node degree k value, Xu Jia Hui 
588 station (node 8), Peoples’ Square station (node 13), Han Zhong Road station (node 15) and West 
589 Nanjing Road (node 39) are selected for analysis.  In this example node degree k is equal to 6 for 
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590 each of these stations.  Again, 24 possible recovery sequences are evaluated in the resilience 
591 analysis.  The respective values Re calculated from Eq. 13 are listed in Table 7.  It is interesting 
592 that the values of Re for different recovery sequences are quite close to one another.  Hence, in 
593 the present case the effect of the sequence of recovery for the nodes considered is not significant 
594 for the resilience of the metro network.  However, it should not be concluded, in general, that 
595 this effect is caused by the same node degree. The reason is rather the similar contribution of 
596 these nodes to the network connectivity, as the calculated robustness of the network connectivity 
597 after the disruption of each node is almost the same among these four nodes. 
598 Case 3: Recovery cost to rebuild a disrupted metro station
599 In this hypothetical example, a metro station is disrupted completely at time t0 and requires 
600 rebuilding of the damaged station.  For ease of discussion, t0 is assumed to be zero.  In addition, 
601 time-value of money is not considered in this example for simplicity.  During the repair 
602 procedure, the metro station is closed to the public.  As mentioned previously, the disruption cost 
603 in the recovery stage is assumed to only include the income loss related to metro tickets.  From 
604 the statistics of the Shanghai metro, the daily passenger flow volume is more than 10 million.  
605 Hence, the disruption of one station among the 303 stations of the whole network is assumed to 
606 lead in a loss of about 40 thousand passengers flow volume every day.  The ticket price of 
607 Shanghai metro is about 4 RMB on average.  For this case, from Eq. 13b, the disruption cost 
608 during the recovery procedure can be calculated as below:
609  1 01 4 400002disruptionC t t    (15)
610 where t1 is the recovered time moment that is unknown and needs to be optimized and t0 is equal 
611 to zero that is assumed in this example.  
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612 The rebuilding of a metro station requires several stages in sequence, including the site 
613 investigation, construction of a pile foundation of underground structures, construction of a soil 
614 retaining system, soil excavation with construction of supports and dewatering, and construction 
615 of underground structures of the metro station.  From personal communication with the managers 
616 in charge of design, construction and operation, Table 8 shows a typical example of repair 
617 options associated with the direct cost and duration for rebuilding one typical metro station in 
618 Shanghai.  It is quite obvious from direct cost perspectives that the shorter the repair duration, 
619 the higher the cost. Solving such a typical time-cost tradeoff requires the use of linear and integer 
620 programming (LP/IP) models, such as Liu et al. (1995).  Table 9 shows the calculated results of 
621 repair duration and associated direct cost of construction.  The indirect cost is assumed, in this 
622 example, to be equal to 100 thousands RMB per day.  Hence, the total indirect cost can also be 
623 calculated based on the calculated duration, as shown in Table 9.  Figure 14a shows the 
624 calculated direct cost, indirect cost and the repair cost against the repair duration, respectively 
625 (solid circles for Crepair, hollow triangles for direct cost and hollow rectangles for indirect cost).  
626 It is observed from Figure 14a that the optimized repair duration based on repair cost is around 
627 455 days.  Corresponding to this calculated repair duration, the disruption cost in terms of the 
628 ticket income loss can be derived from Eq. 15, as displayed in Table 9.  Hence, the total cost 
629 Ctotal both including Cdisruption and Crepair can be obtained as shown in Figure 14b (solid circles for 
630 Ctotal, hollow circles for Crepair and hollow rectangles for Cdisruption).  The optimized repair duration 
631 after incorporating the income loss is about 450 days, which is less than the optimized duration 
632 considering only repair cost.  This finding is reasonable, as the income loss will continue to 
633 increase when the repair work is not finished.  In this example, the disruption cost only includes 
634 the ticket income loss, resulting in a five-day decrease of the optimized duration.  Although the 
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635 number of days in this case is small, the best repair duration might be reduced further as other 
636 cost elements of disruption are considered.  If the other disruption cost as shown in Table 1 is 
637 considered to be proportional to the ticket income loss, i.e., λ = (Cdisruption-Cticket)/Cticket, Figure 
638 14c has illustrated the effect of parameter λ on the optimized repair duration days.  It is clear that 
639 as the λ becomes larger, i.e., that is to say, the other disruption cost increases, the optimized 
640 repair duration days would be greatly reduced.  It is consistent with the engineering practice that 
641 if the disruption cost is invaluable or social effect of the metro accident is unacceptable, the best 
642 repair strategy should be as fast as possible. 
643 4. Conclusions
644 In view of the ever-increasing concerns on the safety of metro systems, a general framework 
645 for resilience analysis of large-scale metro networks is presented in this paper.  This framework 
646 includes the topological mapping of a metro network and the quantitative evaluation of 
647 robustness and vulnerability as a basis to quantify resilience and to derive decisions regarding the 
648 most resilient recovery strategy. The analysis framework captures both random failure and 
649 intentional attacks.  The node connectivity, defined by the network efficiency Ef, is regarded to 
650 be the key performance criterion of a metro network. The proposed resilience assessment 
651 framework is applied to the Shanghai metro network, which is one of the largest metro networks 
652 in the world.  The following conclusions are drawn from analysis.
653 1) The Shanghai metro system is a typical small-world and scale-free network under the 
654 topological L-space.  It has strong connectivity locally and a good quality of operation for the 
655 whole network.  The characteristics of a scale-free network, i.e., strong robustness of network 
656 connectivity under random attacks; but serious vulnerability under intentional attacks, has 
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657 been quantitatively validated by the proposed analysis model for evaluation of robustness and 
658 vulnerability for the Shanghai metro network.  
659 2) The vulnerability of the metro network is quantified by the network global efficiency when 
660 removing disrupted nodes.  However, the magnitude of vulnerability when removing a 
661 disrupted node does not only depend on the degree of this node, but also on the contribution 
662 of this node to the global network efficiency.  That is, the most critical node for vulnerability 
663 of a metro network, i.e., Caoyang Road station in the Shanghai case, might not be the node 
664 with the largest node degree k but is the node with the largest contribution to the network 
665 connectivity.  
666 3) The recovery strategy in terms of recovery sequence for the case of recovering a multi-line 
667 exchange station and the case of recovering multi stations can be derived with the concept of 
668 minimizing the area of the resilience triangle based on the performance evolution curves.  
669 Similar to the vulnerability analysis, the optimum recovery sequence depends not only on the 
670 degree of the recovered nodes but also on the contribution of the recovered nodes to the 
671 network connectivity.  Given an optimized recovery sequence, the recovery time duration can 
672 be optimized by minimizing the cost including the disruption and repair cost for the disrupted 
673 metro system.  The total cost is a non-monotonic function of repair duration time t1, with its 
674 local minimum of cost indicating the best choice for recovery measures at the associated 
675 optimum time t1.  
676 It should be specifically noted that the topology of the metro network discussed in this paper 
677 is under the assumption of an undirected and unweighted network.  Although this simplification 
678 is widely accepted for basic understandings of a large-scale infrastructure network, some of the 
679 practical factors are not included in this model, such as the physical length of tunnels between 
31
680 stations, the time and route for exchanging metro lines, the volume for different metro lines and 
681 also political factors.  Those weights on the importance of nodes and links in the metro network 
682 could be explored in future studies.  
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688 6. Notations
689 G Topological vector for metro network
690 S Node set of a metro network
691 si Node in a metro network
692 N Node number in a metro network
693 E Link set of a metro network
694 eij Link between node si and sj in a network
695 A Correlation matrix for a network
696 aij Correlation between node si and node sj
697 dij Path length between node si and sj
698 L Characteristic path length of a network
699 D Diameter of a network
700 Ci Clustering coefficient for a node in a network
701 C Clustering coefficient of a network
702 P(k) Distribution of node degree for a network
703 Ef Network efficiency
704 V Vulnerability of topological metro network
705 Q(t) System performance of a metro network at time t
706 t0 Time moment when failure or attacks occur to the metro network
707 t1 Time moment when the metro network is fully recovered from a disruption
32
708 th Time duration from the disruption moment t0 to the recovered moment t1
709 Re Resilience index for metro network
710 Ctotal Cost during the system disruption
711 Ctotal, PV Present value equal to the total cost at time of recovery 
712 Cdisruption Cost referred to the loss of system performance
713 Cticket Cost referred to the income loss of metro ticket
714 Vol Passenger volume of the metro network
715 Voln Initial passenger volume of a metro network in normal condition
716 Vold Reduced passenger volume of a metro network after disruption
717 VolLoss Total loss of the passenger volume during the disruption 
718 Crepair Cost related to the implementation of repair measures 
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838 Table 1 Cost produced due to disruption of metro station
Cost Category Content
track 
track barrier
escalator
signal board
ticket barrier
air-conditioning system
Damaged equipment
ventilation system
managing control room
power plant room
ventilation room
signal system room
Abandonment of facility
escape shaft
metro ticket
retail
mall
rental
Income loss
real estate
Disruption cost
Stocks stocks
salary of workers
monitoring and inspection before repair
site investigation 
construction materials
rental of engineering machinery
Direct cost
purchase of  power, ventilation and signal system
time value
Repair Cost
Indirect cost social impact 
839
38
841
842 Table 2 Characteristic indicators of Shanghai metro network
Characteristic of Network Calculated value for Shanghai metro
Node N 303
Link 350
Average node degree k* 2.31
Characteristic path length L 14.87
Diameter of network D 41
Network cluster coefficient C 0.0082
Limit state of L (ln N / ln k*) 6.82
Limit state of C (k* / N) 0.0076
843
39
845
846
847 Table 3 Ranking of node vulnerability
No. Removed node Vulnerability V V/Ef (%) Node degree k
1 Caoyang Rd. Stn. 0.0073 7.37 4
2 Shanghai Railway Stn. 0.0066 6.69 4
3 Siping Rd. Stn 0.0065 6.57 4
4 Zhenping Rd. Stn. 0.0065 6.55 4
5 Longyang Rd. Stn. 0.0062 6.24 5
6 Yishan Rd. Stn. 0.0062 6.22 5
7 Century Ave Stn. 0.0062 6.22 8
8 Hongkou Football Stadium Stn. 0.0052 5.18 4
9 Luoshan Rd. Stn. 0.0050 5.08 4
10 Original Sports Center Stn. 0.0044 4.46 5
848
40
850
851
852 Table 4 Re for different line recovery sequences
Recovery sequence(*) Re Recovery sequence Re
2-6-9-4 0.974 6-4-2-9 0.968
2-6-4-9 0.973 4-2-9-6 0.967
6-2-9-4 0.973 4-6-2-9 0.967
6-2-4-9 0.972 9-2-4-6 0.966
2-9-6-4 0.971 6-9-4-2 0.965
2-4-6-9 0.971 4-9-2-6 0.964
2-4-9-6 0.970 6-4-9-2 0.964
6-9-2-4 0.969 9-4-2-6 0.964
2-9-4-6 0.969 9-6-4-2 0.963
4-2-6-9 0.969 4-6-9-2 0.963
9-2-6-4 0.969 4-9-6-2 0.962
9-6-2-4 0.968 9-4-6-2 0.962
853 Note: * Sequence 2-6-9-4 stands for the recovery sequence for metro line 2 as the first, line 6 as 
854 the second, line 9 as the third and line 4 as the last.
855
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857
858
859 Table 5 Best recovery sequence of metro lines for all exchange stations in Shanghai by 
860 minimizing the resilience triangle.
Metro Station Best metro line recovery sequence 
Xujiahui Stn. 11-1-9
Shanxi Rd.(S) Stn. 12-10-1
People’s Square Stn. 2-8-1
Hanzhong Rd. Stn. 1-12-13
Nanjing Rd.(W) Stn. 12-2-13
Longyang Rd. Stn. 2-16-7
Yishan Rd. Stn. 9-3-4
Oriental Sports Center Stn. 8-11-6
Caobao Rd. Stn. 12-1
Shanghai Sport Center Stn. 1-4
Changshu Rd. Stn. 7-1
Shanghai Railway Stn. 1-3
Zhongshan Park Stn. 2-3
Jiangsu Rd. Stn. 11-2
Jing’an Temple Stn. 2-7
Nanjing Rd.(E) Stn. 2-10
Longcao Rd. Stn. 12-3
Hongqiao Rd. Stn. 10-3
Jinshajiang Rd. Stn. 13-3
Caoyang Rd. Stn. 11-3
Zhenping Rd. Stn. 7-3
Hongkou Football Stadium Stn. 3-8
Hailun Rd. Stn. 4-10
Dalian Rd. Stn. 12-4
Lancun Rd. Stn. 4-6
Xizang Rd.(S) Stn. 8-4
Damuqiao Rd. Stn. 12-4
Dong’an Rd. Stn. 4-7
Jufeng Rd. Stn. 6-12
Gaoke Rd.(W) Stn. 7-6
Yaohua Rd. Stn. 7-8
Longhua Rd.(M) Stn. 7-12
Zhaojiabang Rd. Stn. 9-7
Changshou Rd. Stn. 7-13
Siping Rd. Stn. 10-8
Qufu Rd. Stn. 8-12
Laoximen Stn. 8-10
Lujiabang Rd. Stn. 9-8
42
Jiashan Rd. Stn. 12-9
Madang Rd. Stn. 13-9
Jiaotong University Stn. 11-10
Xintiandi Stn. 10-13
Tiantong Rd. Stn. 12-10
Longde Rd. Stn. 11-13
Longhua Stn. 11-12
Luoshan Rd. Stn. 16-11
Shanghai South Railway Stn. 1-3
Hongqiao Airport Terminal 2 Stn. 2-10
Baoshan Rd. Stn. 3-4
861
43
863
864 Table 6 Resilience index Re for different recovery sequence of metro stations with different node 
865 degrees.
Recovery sequence (*) Re Recovery sequence Re
16-43-133-13 0.927 43-13-16-133 0.906
43-16-133-13 0.926 133-43-13-16 0.904
16-133-43-13 0.923 16-13-133-43 0.903
43-133-16-13 0.921 43-13-133-16 0.901
16-43-13-133 0.920 13-16-43-133 0.895
43-16-13-133 0.919 13-43-16-133 0.894
133-16-43-13 0.919 133-13-16-43 0.894
133-43-16-13 0.917 133-13-43-16 0.893
16-133-13-43 0.911 13-16-133-43 0.890
43-133-13-16 0.908 13-43-133-16 0.889
16-13-43-133 0.907 13-133-16-43 0.886
133-16-13-43 0.907 13-133-43-16 0.885
866 Note: * Recovery sequence 16-43-133-13 means the recovery for node 16 (Shanghai Railway 
867 station) as the first, node 43 (Century Ave station) as the second, node 133 (Oriental Sports 
868 Center station) as the third and node 13 (People’s Square station) as the last. 
869
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872
873 Table 7 Resilience index Re for different recovery sequence of stations with the same node 
874 degrees.
Recovery sequence Re Recovery sequence Re
15-39-8-13 0.969 13-8-39-15 0.965
39-15-8-13 0.968 39-8-13-15 0.965
15-8-39-13 0.967 13-8-15-39 0.965
15-13-8-39 0.966 13-39-15-8 0.965
15-39-13-8 0.966 39-13-15-8 0.965
13-39-8-15 0.966 13-15-39-8 0.964
39-13-8-15 0.966 8-15-39-13 0.964
15-8-13-39 0.966 8-39-15-13 0.963
39-8-15-13 0.966 8-15-13-39 0.962
13-15-8-39 0.966 8-13-39-15 0.962
39-15-13-8 0.966 8-39-13-15 0.962
15-13-39-8 0.965 8-13-15-39 0.962
875
45
877 Table 8 Repair options for rebuilding a metro station in Shanghai
Procedure Options Cost(million RMB)
Duration
(day)
crew1+equipment1 6 50Site investigation crew2+equipment2 8 40
Pile foundation crew1+equipment1 6 30
crew1+equipment1 29 80Retaining wall crew2+equipment2 33 70
crew1+equipment1 15 180Excavation /support 
/dewatering crew2+equipment2 20 165
crew1+equipment1 30 120Underground 
structure crew2+equipment2 35 110
878
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880 Table 9 Integrated repair duration and cost for rebuilding a metro station in Shanghai
CrepairDuration (day) Direct Cost Indirect cost sum Cdisruption Ctotal
415 102.0 41.5 143.5 33.2 176.7
420 98.5 42.0 140.5 33.6 174.1
425 95.1 42.5 137.6 34.0 171.6
430 92.5 43.0 135.5 34.4 169.9
435 90.9 43.5 134.4 34.8 169.2
440 89.5 44.0 133.5 35.2 168.7
445 88.0 44.5 132.5 35.6 168.1
450 87.0 45.0 132.0 36.0 168.0
455 86.4 45.5 131.9 36.4 168.3
460 86.0 46.0 132.0 36.8 168.8
881 Note: cost unit is million RMB.
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887 (a)
888
889 (b)
890 Figure 1. L-space type of topological graph for typical metro network: a) example of metro 
891 network; b) topological graph corresponding to the metro network
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903 Figure. 3 Recovery strategy for a multi-line exchange station (three-line exchange as an 
904 example): a) original state; b) disconnected state; c) first stage of recovery; d) second stage of 
905 recovery; 
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930 Figure 8 Typical topological network for the Shanghai metro system
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937 Figure 9 Distribution of node degrees for 303 metro stations in the Shanghai metro system: a) 
938 histogram of k; b) linear fitting of the relative frequency of p(k) with k for data from year of 2015
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942 Figure 10 Robustness of the Shanghai metro network under different node removal type (Data 
943 for year of 2010 is extracted from Zhang et al., (2011))
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947 Figure 11 The effect of failure of Century Ave station on the surrounding network
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